Abstract: Ten years on from signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement, is the Republic of Macedonia's peace process, of which municipal decentralisation is a primary component, broadly benefitting all communities equally? To what extent is municipal decentralisation and minority protection mechanisms administered at the local level preserving Macedonian society's multiethnic character, or has the country taken a step closer towards the development of a binational state? There were definitely 'winners' as a result of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but were there also 'losers', and who are they? The decentralisation process in Macedonia has widely been regarded as a success story by regional and international actors alike. It is frequently considered a suitable model of ethnic conflict management that can be replicated in other regional contexts, such as for Serbs living in neighbouring Kosovo. Decentralisation sought to offer limited autonomy to Macedonia's ethnic communities, in particular the ethnic Albanians. By increasing the number of competencies administered at the municipal level, the reforms aimed to provide local, culturally diverse communities greater control over the management of their own affairs. This paper seeks to apprise the minority rights protection mechanisms contained in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, particularly those at the municipal level, along with implementation of the wider of decentralisation reforms. The paper will also consider the claim that the protection mechanisms envisaged in Ohrid and the process of decentralisation to date has not benefitted all Macedonia's ethnic communities equally. Instead, it has reinforced steps towards bi-nationalism at the expense of genuine multiculturalism.
Introduction
Ten years on from signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement, is the Republic of Macedonia's1 peace process, of which municipal decentralisation is a primary component, broadly benefitting all communities equally? To what extent is municipal decentralisation and minority protection mechanisms administered at the local level preserving Macedonian society's multiethnic character, or has the country taken a step closer towards the development of a bi-national state? There were definitely 'winners' as a result of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but were there also 'losers', and who are they?
The decentralisation process in Macedonia has widely been regarded as a success story by regional and international actors alike. It is frequently considered a suitable model of ethnic conflict management that can be replicated in other regional contexts, such as for Serbs living in neighbouring Kosovo. Decentralisation sought to offer limited autonomy to Macedonia's ethnic communities, in particular the ethnic Albanians. By increasing the number of competencies administered at the municipal level, the reforms aimed to provide local, culturally diverse communities greater control over the management of their own affairs. This paper seeks to apprise the minority rights protection mechanisms contained in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, particularly those at the municipal level, along with implementation of the wider of decentralisation reforms. The paper will also consider the claim that the protection mechanisms envisaged in Ohrid and the process of decentralisation to date has not benefitted all Macedonia's ethnic communities equally. Rather, it has reinforced steps towards binationalism at the expense of genuine multiculturalism which, according to Bhikhu Parekh2, regards minority cultures equally central to a state's identity (Parekh, 2006: 6) .
Ohrid Framework Agreement and Minority Rights Protection Mechanisms
Macedonia became an independent state in September 1991. The most southerly located of the former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia shares borders with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo and Serbia; and its ethnically diverse population, although totally a mere two million, reflects the cultural diversity of the region and a legacy changing borders and empirical conquests. According to the most recent census in 2002, Macedonia's ethnic breakdown is 64.18 percent Macedonian, 25.17 percent 1 Hereafter referred to as 'Macedonia'. It should be noted that the 'Republic of Macedonia' is the constitutional name for the state, however this name is the subject of dispute with neighbouring Greece. Consequently, the Republic of Macedonia is currently recognised under its temporary name the 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' ('FYROM') in its dealings with international organisations, such as the United Nations and European Union. 2 According to Bhikhu Parekh, the term 'multiculturalism' implies the traditional culture of the majority should not be give pride of place in state policy. Minority cultures should be equally central to state identity and should be respected and even cherished.
Albanian, 3.85 percent Turkish, 2.66 percent Roma, 0.48 percent Vlach, 1.78 percent Serbian, 0.84 percent Bošniak, and 1.04 percent who declared themselves 'Other' (Statistical Office, 2005: 713) . After a decade of attempts to consolidate the country's transition towards democracy and a market economy, and of appeasing increasingly vocal demands from ethnic Albanian politicians for greater collective rights, Macedonia found itself on the brink of civil war in 2001. The peace agreement 3 that was signed in
August 2001 reflects the demands of the ethnic Albanian insurgents; an issue of significance which will be discussed later, and laid the foundations or a 'Framework' for the enhanced recognition of community rights.
According to Florian Bieber and Veton Latifi, the main goal of the Framework Agreement was to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian community, whilst at the same time address the concerns of the Macedonian majority by preserving the territorial integrity of the unitary state (Bieberr, 2005; Latifi, 2001 ). The Agreement was "designed to usher in an era of genuine, as opposed to cosmetic power-sharing" between Macedonians and Albanians (Gallagher, 2005: 117) . Unlike Bosnia's Dayton Agreement, which aimed to maintain peace by institutionalising ethnicity through the creation of separate territorial and political communities, Macedonia's Framework Agreement claimed "there are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues" (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.1). Its aim was to achieve peace through a process of integration, institutional bargaining and compromise, at both the municipal and state level, rather than through the creation of either federal or regional levels of governance. Its complexity reflects the delicate balance it strikes between consociational and integrative approaches to peace building (Bieber, 2005; Daskalovski, 2006; Ilievski, 2007; Maleska, 2005; Minchev, 2005; Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007) . In doing so, according the Nadège Ragaru, the Agreement endeavoured to "square a circle"; that is, confirm the existence of a unitary state whilst promoting institutional recognition of ethnic diversity (Ragaru, 2008, 21) . Consequently, the Agreement represented a combination of measures designed both to favour multi-ethnicity and the integration of ethnic communities (equitable representation in public administration and enterprises, parliamentary and municipal committees on inter-ethnic relations), and reforms which institutionalise the social and cultural distance that already existed between the different communities (enhanced language rights, municipal decentralisation and special voting procedures) (Ragaru, 2008) .
Of the minority rights protection mechanisms enshrined in the Framework Agreement, greater use of national languages and symbols has probably had most impact on the daily lives of citizens. Under the terms of the Agreement and subsequent Law on the Use of Languages, the Macedonian language remains the official language in the country and is used for international relations 4 (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 7; Official Gazette 2008b). However, any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also recognised as an official language, and can be used for personal 3 Hereafter the 'Framework Agreement'. 4 See also Chapter 11 entitled 'Equality of Nationalities' stated: "Municipalities and the Republic ensure that nationalities be proportionately represented in the municipal assemblies and the assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and be adequately represented in their bodies (Caca, 2001 ).
Macedonia, state institutions are not obliged by law to employ a certain percentage of a particular ethnic group.
Special voting procedures to ensure greater consensus in decision-making within both parliament and municipal councils constitute another mechanism for protecting nonmajority communities living in Macedonia. This procedure, sometimes referred to as 'double-majority' or 'Badinter 7 -majority' voting, operates along similar lines to Arend Lijphart's concept of minority veto and practices adopted in Bosnia. However, it differs in that this right is not given to any one particular community; instead it guarantees certain Constitutional amendments and legislation 8 "cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes from those claiming to belong to non-majority communities (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 5) The final aspect of minority protection contained in the Framework Agreement and subsequent Constitutional amendments was reform of the parliamentary and municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations. A Human Rights Watch report commented in 1996 that, since its formation in 1992, the parliamentary Committee had not played an active role in promoting inter-ethnic dialogue; an observation supported by Henryk Sokalski, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Macedonia (Helsinki Committee, 1996: 16; Sokalski, 2003: 69) . Under the new configuration its mandate, akin with Lijphart's recommendation for arbitration mechanisms to mediate disputes between segments, is to consider issues of inter-community relations, such as application of special voting procedures, and to make proposals for their solution. Parliament is obliged to consider the Committee's appraisals and to make decisions regarding them. The Parliamentary Committee consists of seven members each from the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians, and five members from among the Turks, 7 Named after the French judge Robert Badinter. 8 The relevant laws were defined as those that "directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols". However there was no precise definition or delimitation of the legislation requiring double-majority approval, and this was to give rise to a dispute during 2006 when bills on policing and the Broadcasting Council was passed without a double-majority (Reka. 2008: 66) . For further information on the 'Skopje Agreement' and the development of a list of laws requiring double-majority approval, see Ilievski (2007) .
Vlach, Roma and two other communities (Official Gazette. 2001a, Official Gazette. 2007, 3.3). Previously, the Committee had comprised "two members each from the ranks of the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies, as well as two members from the ranks of other nationalities in Macedonia" (Official Gazette 1991, Art. 78). The reduced influence of Macedonia's smaller communities in this new arrangement has prompted some to remark how little attention has been paid to promoting the political inclusion of these communities (Bieber, 2005: 112) . Similar Committees have also been re-established in municipalities where more than 20 percent of local inhabitants are from non-majority communities (Official Gazette. 2002: 55). 22 ethnically mixed municipalities (out of a total of 85) are obliged to establish these Committees in accordance with the law.
Municipal Decentralisation: a Territorial Solution to Ethnic Issues?
Municipal decentralisation was considered such a crucial aspect of Macedonia's peace process that the Law on Local Self-Government was the only law formally stipulated as a prerequisite for an international donors' conference to be held (Macedonia 2001b, Annex C). In its Basic Principles, the Framework Agreement declared: "The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities" (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 1.5). Decentralisation sought to offer limited autonomy to Macedonia's ethnic Albanians, compatible with the principles of consociationalism, whilst shying away from granting them full or formal autonomy. Indeed, the reforms were supported by another Basic Principle which declared: "There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues" (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.2). One ethnic Albanian member of the opposition observed in 2003 that decentralisation was "a cure against federalisation" (PER, 2003: 11) . Florian Bieber noted that decentralisation was framed to conform to European standards, especially the principle of subsidarity enshrined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, rather than facilitating fully-fledged self-government for the ethnic Albanian community (Bieber, 2005: 116) .
Kamelia Dimitrova has concluded that the devolution of power has generally been perceived as a positive step towards improving inter-ethnic relations, since it places institutional limitations on "unbridled central authority" and provides local communities greater control over the management of their own affairs (Dimitrova, 2004: 176 participation of non-majority communities in public life, thereby increasing their trust and identification with the state, and as a way to maintain the unique identity and culture of national minorities (Dimitrova, 2004: 176; ICG, 1999: 26) .
A significant fear the majority Macedonian population (and some smaller communities as well) held regarding decentralisation in 2001, however, was the concern of being marginalised in Albanian-dominated municipalities (Bieber, 2005: 118) . The worry was that Macedonians would become "foreigners in their own country" because of the extensive use of the Albanian language in these municipalities, with their own identities being considered under threat (ICG, 2000: 6; Brunnbauer, 2002: 17) . Židas Daskalovski also suggests a common fear of being denied access to public resources and employment, and refers to events in 1991, when ethnic Albanians took local power in Tetovo municipality and promptly replaced all Macedonians in charge of the public enterprises in the towns with Albanians (Daskalovski, 2006: 212) . The fact that ethnic communities in Macedonia appear to regard the decentralisation of power to municipalities as a zero-sum game, where one gains control over communities at the expense of the other, exacerbates such fears (Brunnbauer, 2002: 16) . As Nadège Ragaru candidly concluded: "the moment one community comprises above 50 percent of the total population in any given unit of government, that unit becomes 'hers'... Minority rights might be respected, yet community preference will be the rule rather than the exception. In this respect, 'minorities' (nationally) do not behave better than the 'majority' when they are locally dominant" (Ragaru, 2008: 25) .
The process of territorial reorganisation during 2004, when municipal boundaries were redrawn to create 84 municipalities 11 from the previous 123, did little to dispel anxiety over the decentralisation process. In fact, it almost undermined the legitimacy of the entire process (IRIS, 2006: 9) . The apparent lack of any objective criteria upon which to make decisions regarding boundary changes suggested to citizens that the reorganisation was based largely on political and ethnic compromises (Siljanovska- . The obvious lack of transparency within which new boundaries were redrawn also gave rise to accusations that decentralisation was indeed a 'zero-sum game' over local control and access to resources between the two largest ethnic groups (ICG, 2003: 13) . It is within this context, therefore, that the process of decentralisation and the importance of effective minority protection mechanisms at the municipal level need to be considered.
Minority Rights Protection at the Municipal Level
With regard to minority protection mechanisms at the local level, it is important to note that the Framework Agreement and subsequent legislative amendments replicate most of the provisions foreseen at state level. Thus, greater municipal use of national languages and symbols, equitable representation of municipal employees, the use of 'double-majority' voting procedures in municipal councils, and the existence of municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations are all enshrined within the Agreement. This detail is very often neglected by the municipalities themselves, government agencies tasked with monitoring implementation of the Framework Agreement, some international organisations based in Macedonia, and academics alike. Equitable representation of all communities within public administration and enterprises is another critical aspect of minority protection envisaged at both the central and municipal level. However, as with the realisation of community language use locally, progress since 2001 in the municipalities has been hampered by practical considerations rather than simply a lack of political will. "Often", observed the OSCE in its 2009 Decentralisation Survey, "the municipal leadership is willing to implement the principle of equitable representation but possesses only limited resources to do so." Respondents to the same survey regarded the following factors obstruct municipalities' ability to achieve a representative workforce: lack of qualified candidates from nonmajority communities, political pressures to employ staff, and the lack of any legal obligation to do so (OSCE, 2009: 58-9). Indeed, considering the post-2001 non-majority recruitment drive in the public administration began at time when state agencies were under increasing pressure to downsize and when public enterprises were scheduled for restructuring, privatisation and often closure, equitable representation has frequently been regarded as "one of the most sensitive elements of the Ohrid Agreement" ( Municipalities can also establish Committees in areas where local communities comprise less than 20 percent; however this decision is at the discretion of the municipal council. Their role is to enable institutional dialogue between the different ethnic communities and to act as an instrument for enabling direct citizen participation within municipal decision-making processes (CDI, 2007) . The Committees are obliged by law to review issues that refer to the relationships among the local communities, to provide opinions, and to propose ways to resolve problems that may arise between communities. They are critical for resolving issues pertinent to non-majority communities, particularly those requiring the adoption of special voting procedures, since municipal councils are obliged to consider the Committee's opinions and make decisions based on them. The 20 multiethnic municipalities legally required to establish such Committees have now done so 12 and, according to data collated by ZELS at the end of 2010, a further twelve municipalities have on a voluntarily basis (refer to Annex B). It is admirable that so many municipalities have recognised the benefit of establishing Committees for Inter-Ethnic Relations, even though they are not obliged to do so.
In practice, however, research completed by the Community Development Initiative (CDI), a non-governmental organisation based in Tetovo, found the effectiveness of these Committees questionable. The research reported how "citizens remain generally uninformed on the existence of the [Committees]" (CDI, 2007: 9) . The OSCE's recent decentralisation survey collaborates this conclusion, finding that only 19 percent of respondents were aware of their existence (OSCE, 2009a: 62) . A subsequent interview with a senior representative of CDI indicated that their research also found that Committee membership remains highly politicised, members have a limited understanding of their role, and the frequency with which municipal councils fail to consider the recommendations of the Committees is high (CDI March 2009). Such criticism has lead an influential United National Programme in Macedonia to conclude in 2010 that the Committees are "generally found to convene for the sake of demonstrating that they have done so, and they rarely provide advisory, preventive or reactive recommendations" (UN).
The Experiences of the Smaller Communities Locally
There With regard to the use of 'double-majority' voting procedures in municipal councils and the work of municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations, again the smaller communities have benefitted least from these protection mechanisms. As previously discussed, the use of special voting procedures at both the parliamentary and municipal levels only seem to benefit the larger minority communities, leaving the rest politically marginalised (Engström, 2002; Bieber, 2005) . Membership of the municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations also suggests that the smaller communities, particularly the Roma, are frequently sidelined. The Committee membership data displayed at Annex B illustrates how the smaller communities, when they are represented, are frequently outnumbered by the representatives of other, larger local communities, notably Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The significant under-representation of 13 Progress has been greatest in Brvenica, Čair, and Vrapčište municipalities (all with ethnic Albanian Mayors); whilst less impressive in Čaška, Jegunovce, Kičevo, Kruševo, Mavrovo and Rostuša, Petrovec, Sopište, Zelenikovo (all with Macedonian Mayors). 14 In particular the Serbs in Kumanovo, the Roma in Kichevo, and the Bosniak community in Petrovec. It is important to note that Serbs in Čučer-Sandevo and Staro Nagoričane are in fact over-represented in the municipal administrations. However, staffing numbers are small in both municipalities, which may make the proportional analysis less accurate.
women in the membership of these Committees is another alarming development which undoubtedly affects local communities' ability to represent their diverse needs effectively to the local administration. Since there are currently no consequences for municipalities when a community is not represented within a Committee or where that representation is unequal, the NGO Forum doubts municipal leaders will attach a high priority towards resolving such breaches in implementation of the law (Forum, 2008: 7).
Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that not all of Macedonia's ethnic communities are benefitting equally from the minority protection mechanisms enshrined in the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the decentralisation reforms thus far. There were and still are 'losers' in Macedonia's post-conflict political landscape, and these are the smaller ethnic communities living scattered throughout the country who fail to reach the thresholds required to benefit from the envisaged protection mechanisms. As a result, these smaller communities are denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in their local administrations and to influence the delivery of newly devolved competencies in a way which benefits their own communities. Macedonians and ethnic Albanians residing in small numbers in municipalities where another ethnic community may be in the majority are also subject to a similar fate. The reason for this is partly because the Framework Agreement was never actually designed to offer equal protection to all Macedonia's ethnic communities, and partly a result of poor implementation of the law at state and, most significantly, municipal levels. 
